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A GOODNESS-OF-FIT ETHIC
FOR INFORMED CONSENT
Celia B. Fisher*
INTRODUCTION
The orientation of legal advocates and social policy makers re-
garding the rights of the mentally infirm has shifted considerably
over the years. Historically, adults with known mental disorders
were presumed incompetent and restricted from opportunities to
make decisions for themselves.' Disregard for the rights of institu-
tionalized and impaired persons resulted in abuses, such as the in-
famous case at the Willowbrook State School, where biomedical
researchers infected children identified as "mentally defective"
with viral hepatitis without their knowledge, and with the question-
able voluntary consent of their parents.2
In the wake of Willowbrook, advocates for people with mental
retardation have made significant legal gains for individuals with
decisional impairments. This movement led to including policies re-
quiring the deinstitutionalization of individuals whose futures had
largely been relegated to severely restricted institutional living,
regulations for intermediate care facilities, court decisions guaran-
teeing the right of persons with mental retardation to make their
own decisions, and ultimately, recognition by the courts that a di-
agnosis of a mental disorder is not a presumption that the individ-
ual is incompetent to make decisions.3
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1. See RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CON-
SENT 290 (1986); ARNOLD J. RoSoFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS 234 (1981).
2. T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1022 (Sup. Ct.
1995); see also JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 1007 (1972).
3. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 634 F. 2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982); certified questions answered sub nom. T.D. v. N. Y. State Office of Mental
Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1996); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147
(D.N.J. 1978), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981); vacated and re-
manded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand 720 F. 2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Conditions of
Participation for Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, 53 Fed. Reg.
20,448, 20,505 (June 3, 1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483); AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, A GUIDE TO CONSENT 95-125 (Robert D. Dinerstein et al. eds., 1999);
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Despite these gains, balancing the obligation to respect the rights
of those with mental impairments to be treated as autonomous
members of the moral community with the need to ensure that ill-
informed or incompetent decisions will not jeopardize their welfare
remains an ongoing ethical challenge for legal advocates, practi-
tioners, and family members.4 This Essay argues that informed
consent policies for adults with mental disorders need to reflect a
relational approach that re-conceptualizes consent vulnerability in
terms of a "goodness-of-fit" between patient characteristics and
the consent context.
1. CONSENT VULNERABILITY AS A RELATIONAL CONSTRUCT
Adults with mental disorders, like all people, are linked to others
in relationships of reciprocity and dependency.5 Conceptualizing
consent impairments as a product of the relationship between the
person and the consent context shifts ethical inquiry away from an
exclusive focus on the patient's or research participant's mental in-
firmities. Instead, it focuses on those aspects of the consent setting
that are creating or exacerbating consent vulnerability, and consid-
ers how the setting can be modified to produce a consent process
that best reflects and protects the patient's/participant's hopes, val-
ues, concerns, and welfare.6 From a relational perspective, morally
responsible informed consent practices require more than simply
evaluating whether a patient/participant understands the nature,
risks, and benefits of procedures for which consent is sought,
toward a reconfiguration of the consent context itself. Such recon-
figurations involve remedial efforts to enhance consent compre-
hension coupled with efforts to attain mutual understandings
among consent stakeholders regarding their values and concerns.7
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELA-
TIONSHIP 169-88 (1982); WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZA-
TION IN HUMAN SERVICES 208-36 (1972).
4. See Donald N. Bersoff et al., Legal Issues in the Assessment and Treatment of
Individuals with Dual Diagnoses, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 55, 55-62
(1994); J. W. Ellis, Decisions by and for People with Mental Retardation: Balancing
Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1779, 1804-09 (1992);
Celia B. Fisher, Relational Ethics and Research with Vulnerable Populations, in 2
NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 29-51 (1999);.
5. Margaret Urban Walker, Autonomy, Beneficence, and Justice in the Wider
Context, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 291, 292 (2002).
6. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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Embedded in law and professional standards, the modern doc-
trine of informed consent is too often grounded in a limited defini-
tion of autonomy that is restricted to respect for an individual's
right to self-governance and privacy.8 However, as Professor
James Childress has pointed out, the ideal of autonomy must be
distinguished from the conditions for autonomous choice.9 Within
this framework autonomy need not be conceptualized as isolated
or isolating,10 but as an expression of connectedness to others.
From this relational perspective, respect for autonomy requires
that practitioners and investigators make every attempt to create a
goodness-of-fit between the person and the consent context that
maximizes opportunities for the individual to provide informed, ra-
tional, and voluntary decisions. When such efforts are insufficient
to insure adequate consent, individuals should be encouraged to
either select a consent partner, or to yield decision-making to a
consent surrogate who can help arrive at a decision that best re-
flects the patient's wishes and concerns.
From a relational perspective, autonomy involves not only an
obligation to self, but also to others." Thus, when individuals with
impaired decisional capacity choose to use a consent partner or
surrogate, the patient and the partner/surrogate are obligated to
understand and respect each other's concerns and values. Thus, a
goodness-of-fit ethic encourages an exchange of views between
persons with mental disorders and their formal or informal consent
partners that illuminates, rather than eliminates, the moral posi-
tions of each. This exchange of views in turn leads to a consent
decision that accommodates, rather than subjugates, these values.' 2
II. INFORMED, RATIONAL, AND VOLUNTARY
PERSON-CONTEXT CONSENT
Informed consent to medical treatment and research represents
a mutual agreement between a practitioner and patient, the valid-
ity of which requires that the consent be informed, rational, volun-
tary, and competent.' 3 The informed aspect of consent requires
8. FADEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7-9.
9. James F. Childress, The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 12-13.
10. See Walker, supra note 5, at 293.
11. Donna M. McKenzie, What Theological Understandings Contribute to Protect-
ing Mentally Impaired Persons in Medical Treatment and Research, 12 ETHICS &
BEHAV. 287, 288 (2002).
12. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 30-31.
13. See generally FADEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
2002]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
that practitioners provide information about the purpose, proce-
dures, potential risks and benefits, and alternative options of treat-
ment or research sufficient for an individual to make a reasoned
decision. Such information, however, may not be sufficient for in-
dividuals with mental disorders who either lack general knowledge
about health care treatments and patient rights, or who have not
had the opportunity to make autonomous decisions. In these situa-
tions, a goodness-of-fit between the person and consent context
might require modifying consent procedures to include "reasona-
ble disclosure" of practical information about those general aspects
of health care, or research essential for a knowledgeable decision
to be made.' 4
To meet the rational requirement of informed consent, an indi-
vidual needs to be able to understand the information presented
and appreciate the consequences to oneself of agreeing or declin-
ing treatment or research participation.15 Although impairments in
abstract reasoning can limit this ability, matching the language
level of consent information to that of a patient/participant with a
mental disorder, and modifying those aspects of the consent setting
that may be stress provoking for that particular individual, can re-
duce person-context consent vulnerability.
The voluntary requirement of consent is meant to insure that in-
dividuals are not coerced into participation, and are free to with-
draw from treatment or biomedical research at any time.16 In some
contexts people with mental disorders may be particularly vulnera-
ble to coercion and exploitation.17 For example, they may fear dis-
approval from family caretakers or may feel that they must be
compliant in deference to the authority of the requesting practi-
tioner. Some may have had little experience in exercising their
rights, or may fear the discontinuation of other services if they are
living in a treatment residence. Modifying the consent setting to
reduce the perception of power inequities, to provide opportunities
to practice decision-making, and to construct concrete ways of
demonstrating that other services will not be 'compromised, can
strengthen the goodness-of-fit between person and consent setting.
14. See Allan M. Tepper & Amiram Elwork, Competence to Consent to Treatment
as a Psycholegal Construct, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 205, 213 (1984).
15. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 250.
16. Id. at 8.
17. See id. at 288-92.
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III. DEFINING CONSENT COMPETENCE
How to judge whether an individual is competent to consent
continues to be debated in ethical and legal arenas.18 Appelbaum
and his colleagues have developed the most influential taxonomy
for evaluating capacity to consent based on a consideration of the
practical context in which clinical and legal decisions are made. 19
According to this taxonomy, consent competence can be evaluated
in terms of four psycho-legal standards.20
The first, and least stringent of the four standards, is communi-
cating a choice.21 In obtaining consent to treatment from persons
with mental impairments, failure to object has commonly been
construed as an expression of voluntary agreement.22 Thus, a mini-
mum psycho-legal standard requiring documentation that the pa-
tient or research participant has communicated a choice orally or
in writing will protect the individual against excessive paternalism.
The second psycho-legal standard, factual understanding, per-
tains to comprehension of information about the nature, timing,
and potential risks and benefits of treatment.23 As mentioned pre-
viously, factual understanding is not simply dependent upon intel-
lectual capacity, but is linked to the degree to which an individual
has had previous experience with the treatment in question, and
the extent to which the practitioner or legal advocate educates the
individual regarding treatment options.24
The third psycho-legal standard, appreciation of the situation, re-
quires that the individual understand not only the procedures,
risks, and benefits of the research, but also the medical and per-
sonal implications for her own circumstances.25 In some instances
this may be difficult for adults with mental disorders. For example,
lack of insight into the presence of the illness is common in schizo-
phrenia and some other psychiatric disorders, making it difficult
18. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 83-90 (1987); Barry Rosenfeld, Competence to Consent to Re-
search: Where Psychology, Ethics and the Law Intersect, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 284,
284-87 (2002).
19. See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT TO TREATMENT 127-48 (1998); Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Com-
petency to Consent to Research: A Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIA-
TRY 951, 952-56 (1982).
20. Applebaum & Roth, supra note 19, at 952-53.
21. Id.
22. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1808.
23. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 19, at 953-54.
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 19, at 954.
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for some people in the acute stages of these illnesses to evaluate
the risks and benefits of treatment.26 Some studies, however, have
questioned whether denial of mental illness is sufficient justifica-
tion for a finding of incompetence.27
The fourth psycho-legal standard, rational manipulation of infor-
mation, is the most stringent, requiring the ability to weigh risks
and benefits in order to arrive at a "reasonable" outcome of
choice. 28 Roth, Meisels, and Lidz warn that holding patients to a
standard that requires the calculation of risks and benefits poses
legal and ethical problems because it is difficult to demonstrate
that any person's preference directly relates to the rationale she
may offer, and rejection of an individual's rationale can potentially
be used to justify widespread substitute decision-making for those
with cognitive impairments.29 Moreover, for adults with mental
disorders who may not make decisions based upon rational calcula-
tions, applying a risk-benefit analysis as the primary standard of
moral agency can deny them freedom of action based upon more
concrete or emotional factors that are equally legitimate expres-
sions of the rights of personhood ° Holding persons to this last
standard of cognitive competence has often justified widespread
substitute decision-making for those with mental impairments, es-
pecially when the disabled person disagrees with the risk-benefit
assessment of her physician or family members.3 Furthermore,
since the decision-making styles of those assumed to have no
mental disorder are rarely evaluated, some researchers have
warned that adults with mental illnesses may be unfairly held to a
26. Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisionally Impaired Research Subjects, (Commissioned
Paper), in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 1-4.
27. See Trudi Kirk & Donald N. Bersoff, How Many Procedural Safeguards Does
It Take to Get a Psychiatrist to Leave the Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due Process Anal-
ysis of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 45,
64 (1996); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: The Mac-
Arthur Capacity Instruments (Commissioned Paper), in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVI-
SORY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 59-78.
28. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 19, at 954.
29. L. H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 282-83 (1977).
30. See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION XViii (1945);
Fisher, supra note 4, at 41; McKenzie, supra note 11, at 289; Guy A.M. Widdershoven
& M. Smits, Ethics & Narratives, in ETHICS AND PROCESS IN THE NARRATIVE STUDY
OF LIVES 275, 280 (Ruthellen Josselson ed., 1996).
31. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 41.
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higher standard of competency than commonly applied to the gen-
eral population.32
While state laws provide standards and procedures for ap-
pointing guardians to individuals declared legally incompetent,
these judicial proceedings are generally not required for treatment
or research consent decisions for individuals who, although not de-
clared legally incompetent, have diagnosed mental disorders that
may impair their decision-making in particular contexts.33 From a
relational perspective, appointment of a consent surrogate in these
gray legal areas is only ethically justified if: (1) the person has
agreed that proxy oversight or assistance is a desirable means of
protecting her interests; (2) her assent to participate is sought in
addition to the surrogate's consent; and (3) her dissent over-rides
the proxy opinion.34
IV. ASSESSING AND ENHANCING INFORMED
CONSENT COMPETENCE
To date there is no widespread consensus on how consent capac-
ity should be measured.35 Despite the lack of valid assessment
techniques, individuals with and without mental impairments, often
assume that irrespective of a person's legal status or actual deci-
sion-making capacity, permission of a surrogate is required when
consent is sought from a patient with an identified mental
disorder.36
Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso have constructed a popular
series of instruments known as the "MacArthur scales" to measure
the four psycho-legal standards of consent.37 Using these scales,
32. C. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSY-
CHIATRY 17 (1984); see Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 19, at 952; J. F. Drane, The
Many Faces of Competence, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 17-21; Fisher,
supra note 4, at 41; C. Donald Morris et al., Determining the Capability of Individuals
with Mental Retardation to Give Informed Consent, 98 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION
263, 263-72 (1993).
33. Elizabeth Cooper, Panel Remarks on Legal and Psychological Foundations of
Informed Consent, at Conference at the Fordham University School of Law entitled
Religious Values and Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics 358-66 (Jan. 29, 2002) (transcript on
file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
34. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 42; Celia B. Fisher, Respecting and Protecting Men-
tally Impaired Persons in Medical Research, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 280, 282 (2002).
35. See generally Saks, supra note 27, at 59.
36. See C. Ficker-Terrill & L. Rowitz, Choices, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION 63, 63
(1991); Ellis, supra note 4, at 1779-1809; Fisher, supra note 4, at 31.
37. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 J.L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 105, 105-26 (1995); see GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 19, at 101-26;
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researchers have found that hospitalized patients with schizophre-
nia, Alzheimer's disease, and depression have a poorer under-
standing of consent information than individuals with physical
illnesses.3" Others have found that intellectual classifications of
adults with mental retardation are predictive of global indices of
consent capacity. 39 However, few studies tell us about the particu-
lar aspects of consent that may be easy or difficult for individuals
with mental impairments to understand.4 °
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission has stated that it is
"inappropriate to suppose that those who exhibit some decision
making deficit cannot be helped to attain a level of functioning that
would enable them to be part of a valid consent process. '"41 Yet,
techniques that could improve consent competence have rarely
been examined. Nonetheless, preliminary findings on the efficacy
of brief written or video presentations on improving prospective
patients' understanding of rights in treatment and research have
been encouraging.42
The Roeher Institute proposed a supported decision-making
model as a means of helping adults with questionable consent com-
petence to exercise self-determination and in recognition that all
adults draw upon the advice and support of others in making im-
portant decisions.43 Adults with decisional impairments are asked
to select a family member, friend, or other trusted person to be
present during an informed consent discussion. The individual and
her support person review information and decide together
whether or not the individual will consent to participation. Sup-
Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study II: Measures of
Ability Related to Competence to Consent Treatment, 19 J.L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127,
1.27-48 (1995).
38. Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Assessing the Competence of Persons with Alzheimer's
Disease in Providing Informed Consent for Participation in Research, 158 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 712, 712-17 (2001).
39. P. Lindsay & R. Luckasson, Consent Screening Interview for Community Resi-
dential Placement: Report on the Initial Pilot Study Data, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION
119, 119-24 (1991); see Morris et al., supra note 32, at 270; R. D. Tustin & M. J. Bond,
Assessing the Ability to Give Informed Consent to Medical and Dental Procedures, 17
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 35, 35-47 (1991).
40. Katy Arscott et al., Consent to Psychological Research by People with an Intel-
lectual Disability, 11 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 77, 77-83 (1998).
41. 1 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 20.
42. See A. Tymchuck, Assent Process, in SOCIAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: ETHICAL ISSUES 128, 135-36 (B. Stanley & J. E. Sieber eds., 1992).
43. ROEHER INST., SEEKING CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH FROM PEO-
PLE WHOSE ABILITY TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION COULD BE QUESTIONED:
THE SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING MODEL 5 (1996).
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ported decision-making can safeguard against the potential for trig-
gering of a legal competency review for adults with disabilities who
do not have legal guardianship. In such cases, being deemed in-
competent solely for the purposes of a single treatment decision
has the potential to jeopardize their autonomy rights in other
contexts.
As new techniques for assessing and enhancing consent capacity
evolve, they must not ignore the importance of individual varia-
tions in the strengths and vulnerabilities that each person brings to
the consent context, and the importance of engaging persons with
intellectual infirmities as partners in the decision-making process.
V. APPLYING RELATIONAL ETHICS-THREE CASES4 4
A. Case One-The Right of Adults with Mental Retardation to
Reject Psychopharmacological Treatment
John is a forty year old man with mental retardation who has
lived in a community residence for the past twenty years. His legal
competency has never been challenged and he does not have a le-
gal guardian. For the past ten years he has sustained a job at a
sheltered workshop, and with assistance from the community resi-
dence staff, he is able to manage his small income. Over the past
twelve months, he has been involved in physical fights with other
consumers at his residence. Standard behavioral and psycho-
pharmacological treatments for aggressive disorders have not
helped John, and his aggressive behavior is increasingly perceived
as dangerous to the staff and other residents. If he cannot control
his behavior he may have to be moved to a more restrictive institu-
tion. John is eligible for treatment at a nearby hospital testing a
new drug for aggressive disorders, but he refuses to participate be-
cause he distrusts the new doctors and is concerned that the side
effects of the medication will prevent him from going to work. The
supervisor of John's residence wishes to overrule John's judgment
and enroll him in the study, because the supervisor believes it may
be John's only chance to keep his job and stay in the residence
where he feels happy and safe.
Does the supervisor have the right to override John's rejection of
treatment? Does he have the obligation to do so? Would the deci-
sion be different if John did not have mental retardation? What
44. The Forum, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 279, 279 (Celia B. Fisher ed., 2002)
(detailing the cases that have been adapted here).
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steps might the supervisor take to achieve the best goodness-of-fit
between John's abilities and the consent context?
First, the supervisor needs to engage in dialogue with John to
understand the reasons for John's refusal of treatment and to share
his own concerns about possible future consequences. The supervi-
sor could take steps to alleviate those concerns, perhaps by having
John visit the hospital, meet the doctors, or discuss how to mini-
mize the treatment's side effects. The supervisor must also con-
sider that his own hopes for John may be clouding his judgment
regarding the probability that the new treatment will work. After
exploring all these avenues, the supervisor could help John con-
sider the pros and cons of his decision, including John's obligation
to himself, and to others in the residence.
Respecting a person's autonomy means respecting, and some-
times protecting, not just their abilities to make choices at particu-
lar moments in time, but their abilities and prospects to live
autonomous lives over the longer term.45 The supervisor must
carefully consider whether overriding John's decision-making au-
thority could have harmful practical consequences. For example,
petitioning the court to appoint a guardian or turning to one of
John's family members to provide surrogate consent (a common,
but legally questionable practice in many community residences
serving adults with mental retardation) could inadvertently initiate
an investigation into John's legal competency to make decisions in
other situations, diminish John's hard won confidence in his deci-
sion-making abilities, and hamper his freedom to make autono-
mous decisions in the future. Such consequences might be just as
hazardous to John's welfare as the possibility of leaving the
residence.
In some instances, when a person's decision-making ability is
limited, it is ethically justifiable to make a substitute decision that
will protect her from harm. However, in this case there is no evi-
dence that John's decision-making is any different from the range
of responses that a person without mental retardation might make
in this situation. There is no guarantee that the new treatment will
work, and no one can say with certainty that moving to a more
restrictive setting will be harmful to John, especially given the fact
that he is having such difficulties in his current residence. Thus, in
this situation, having achieved the best possible goodness-of-fit be-
45. See Walker, supra note 5, at 291.
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tween John's abilities and the consent context, the supervisor
should respect John's right to dissent to the treatment.
B. Case Two-Advanced Directives by an Individual with
Alzheimer's Disease
Nina, a seventy-six year old woman in the beginning stages of
Alzheimer's disease wants to sign an advanced directive consenting
to participate in an experimental treatment study that will not be-
gin until she has reached the advanced stages of Alzheimer's. Her
adult children are afraid the treatment may quicken their mother's
mental decline, and question Nina's authority to provide consent
for a time in the future when her decision-making capacity will be
deficient.
Nina's case illustrates a problem inherent in issuing and follow-
ing advance directives: neither Nina nor her children can know
with certainty how she will think and feel in a diminished state. In
the face of such uncertainty, the protectionist stance taken by
Nina's children does not satisfactorily resolve this issue. Despite
limitations in predicting future reactions, Nina in her present
mental condition, is the most expert in envisioning how she will
respond in an eventual state of cognitive impairment. To respect
Nina's right to self-determination and to insure that her future wel-
fare is protected, a goodness-of-fit process of obtaining ethically
acceptable advanced directives should include a series of informa-
tion sharing sessions among Nina, her children, and the medical
scientists during which: (a) the physicians provide Nina and her
family with information about the anticipated course, nature of,
and potential risks and benefits of the experimental treatment; (b)
Nina provides the practitioners and her children with information
to help them understand her value system, the way she evaluates
physical or emotional pain, her views on the altruistic value of re-
search participation, and other personal perspectives that would al-
low her children to make future decisions from her perspective;
and (c) Nina's children share their moral philosophies on consent-
relevant dimensions so that Nina and they can decide whether or
not the advance directives can be carried out in a manner that hon-
ors everyone's value orientations.46 This last step recognizes that
Nina is also obligated to respect the values and welfare of her
children.
46. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 43; Fisher, supra note 34, at 282-83.
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C. Case Three-Withdrawing a Schizophrenic Patient from
Medication-Free Research
Alice, a twenty-five year old woman with schizophrenia, hates
the disabling physical side effects of the psychoactive medication
she is taking, even though it is successfully controlling her thought
disorder. She consented to be in a medical study designed to test
how long persons with schizophrenia can remain free of psychiatric
problems after stopping medication. Two weeks into the study, her
parents began to worry that some of Alice's "bizarre" behavior was
returning since she stopped the medication. When they asked Al-
ice to withdraw from the study, she refused. Her parents ap-
proached the hospital conducting the study and challenged the
legitimacy of Alice's consent to remain in a study that places her
mental health, and perhaps her life, at risk. The hospital refused to
release her from the study, citing their consent agreement with
Alice.
What went wrong with this consent process? The possibility of
fluctuating consent capacity was easily predicted by the clinical in-
vestigators, since the purpose of the research was to determine how
long individuals with schizophrenia would remain in remission af-
ter the medication was withdrawn. From a goodness-of-fit ethic, it
was incumbent upon the investigators to develop a consent process
that included Alice, the scientists, and either Alice's parents, an-
other adult of her choosing, or a participant advocate who would
be available to make research withdrawal decisions in the event
that Alice's psychotic symptoms returned. During the pre-consent
discussion, investigators should have provided information regard-
ing: (a) anticipated fluctuations in Alice's decision-making capaci-
ties; (b) the safety and monitoring procedures that would be
employed by the research team to protect her welfare; and (c) the
specific criteria for determining that Alice was no longer compe-
tent to make decisions regarding her continued involvement or
withdrawal from the study. In addition, during the pre-consent
meeting, Alice and her decision-making partner should have been
given the opportunity to discuss their views regarding the point at
which decline in Alice's mental health would justify withdrawal
from the study. The goal of the discussion would have been to ar-
rive at a shared understanding of the conditions under which the
judgment of Alice's consent partner(s) would ethically override her
desire to remain in the study.47
47. See Fisher, supra note 34, at 283.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, these three cases illustrate the importance of seek-
ing a goodness-of-fit between a person's decisional capacities and
the consent context. To do so involves engaging adults with mental
disorders as partners in creating respectful and compassionate con-
sent procedures. All people are unique individuals. Thus, consent
procedures should be based upon an understanding of each pro-
spective patient or participant's special characteristics, her consent
strengths and weaknesses, life experiences, and practical concerns.
Such an understanding can be achieved through ongoing dialogue
among patients, their family members, legal advocates, and practi-
tioners to insure that consent procedures reflect an ethic of mutual
obligation, respect, and care.
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